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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE # 2 IS DE NOVO, 
Plaintiff argues in its Brief of Appellee that the issue of whether the lower court 
improperly considered certain facts in determining whether to vacate its prior judgment is 
an issue to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Appellee cites Parker v. 
Ross, 111 P.2d 373 (Utah 1950), for this proposition. In Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 
however, the Court of Appeals stated: 
(W)hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack 
of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to 
the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the 
district court. 
949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). This claim is based on lack of jurisdiction, making 
the decision not to vacate a question of law upon which the district court receives no 
deference. Therefore, the standard of review is de novo. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT AND EX PARTE MOTION DO NOT 
SATISFY THE REASONABALE DILLIGENCE REQUIREMENT OF 
RULE 4(d)(4) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Plaintiff argues that it's Affidavit and Ex Parte Motion was sufficient to satisfy the 
reasonable diligence requirement of Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
4(d)(4)(A) sets forth the general procedural standards a Plaintiff must satisfy before it may resort 
to service by publication: "Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence... the party seeking service 
may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or 
by some other means." 
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Plaintiff contends that this case is distinguishable from Bonneville, 949 P.2d 768. 
Plaintiff argues that the Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville was not concerned with the plaintiffs 
failure to make any efforts to locate the defendant once the plaintiff learned the defendant might 
be residing in California. While it is true that the Court was also concerned with fraud in the 
affidavit, the Bonneville Court noted that, once the plaintiff was informed that the defendant 
might be in California, due diligence required at the very least an attempt to locate the 
defendant's address and an attempt to contact defendant. Id. at 775. Because the plaintiff failed 
to take these steps, the plaintiff failed to meet due diligence requirements. 
Like in Bonneville, Plaintiff learned from its failed attempt at contact by mail that 
Defendants were likely living in California. Despite this knowledge, Plaintiff made no further 
attempt to ascertain any current addresses for Defendants or to contact them. As the Bonneville 
Court noted, "Due diligence requires more than attempting to contact addresses on a single 
form." Id. 
Plaintiff attempts to show that Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 
507 (Utah 1976), is more analogous factually to the case at hand. In Downey, the Court found 
that the plaintiff had met due diligence requirements by contacting the last registered agent of the 
corporation, obtaining his most recent address in California, sending a sheriffs deputy to the 
address, and upon finding that he had moved, attempted to discover a new address by speaking to 
the new occupant. Id. at 507. In contrast, Plaintiff sent one letter (there are two Defendants) to 
an address listed on a single form before submitting its affidavit. Plaintiffs efforts are clearly 
insufficient to meet the standard met by the plaintiff in Downey. 
Plaintiff contends that the facts ofParker v. Ross, 111 P.2d 373 (Utah 1950) are 
analogous to the case at hand. However, the facts of Parker, much like those of Downey, show 
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in comparison how little Plaintiff actually did to locate Defendants. In Parker, the plaintiff 
found the last known address of defendant and sent the Salt Lake County sheriff to serve the 
summons. Upon not finding the defendant at that location, the plaintiff then searched the records 
of the County Recorder, the tax rolls in the County Treasurer's office, the judgment and probate 
indexes, the records of the Assessor and the city treasurer of Salt Lake County, the city 
directories of Salt Lake City "for many years past", and the telephone directory for Salt Lake 
City and the surrounding areas. Id. at 419-420. In this search, plaintiff found two additional 
addresses for plaintiff in Butte, Montana and sent letters to the defendant at these addresses and 
also to General Delivery, Butte, Montana. Id. at 420. When this approach proved unfruitful, 
plaintiff "made inquiry of the city police department of Butte, Montana, and the State Board of 
Health at Helena, Montana." Id. 
Again, Plaintiffs efforts consisted of a single letter sent to a single address listed on a 
single form in order to find the two Defendants. Plaintiff made no other efforts. It is a 
straightforward call to compare the obvious diligence of the plaintiff in Parker with the 
singularly limited action taken by Plaintiff in the case at hand. 
While it is true that Rule 4(d)(4)(A) does not require an exhaustion of all possibilities of 
locating and serving defendants, the Rule does require due diligence. In citing to Justice Wolfe's 
concurring opinion in Parker, the Bonneville Court stated: 
The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that 
which is reasonable under the circumstances and not all possible 
diligence which may be conceived. Nor is it that diligence which 
stops just short of the place where if it were continued might 
reasonably be expected to uncover an address or the fact of death 
of the person on whom service is sought... It is that diligence 
which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so. If the end sought is the address of 
an out-of-state defendant it encompasses those steps most likely, 
under the circumstances, to accomplish that result. 
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949P.2dat775. 
As Plaintiff points out, Rule 4(d)(4)(A) does not list specific actions that a plaintiff must 
take to meet its standard of due diligence. However, taking the above-cited cases as examples, a 
plaintiff must take actions calculated towards actually obtaining the location of a defendant for 
service. In 1950, the Parker Court found that a diligent search of county and city records, as 
well as searches conducted outside of the state were actions that satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 4. 217 P.2d at 419-420. In 1976, the Downey Court found that sending a sheriffs deputy 
to the out-of-state address of the defendant and, upon failure to serve the defendant, attempting 
to locate a more current address for the defendant satisfied these requirements. 545 P.2d at 509. 
In 1999, plaintiffs should have made use of modern resources to satisfy this standard. In 
fact, considering the abundance of print, telephonic and electronic resources for finding people 
currently available at little or no cost to the public, including the well-known ability to conduct 
nationwide Internet name searches in a matter of minutes, modern plaintiffs have little or no 
excuse for failing to exhaust these resources before resorting to service by publication. It is 
abundantly clear that Plaintiffs single action clearly falls well short of the due diligence standard 
of Rule 4(d)(4)(A). 
Accordingly, this case presents an excellent opportunity for this Court to establish a 
specific and objective threshold of essential actions plaintiffs must take before they request the 
trial court to order service by publication. Obviously, in some situations a court may require 
additional measures be taken to locate defendants in order to satisfy reasonable diligence; and 
under other circumstances, the threshold actions may be considered sufficient. In either event, 
this Court could preserve the discretion of the trial court, provide to plaintiffs more objective and 
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identifiable criteria to guide their efforts, and, most importantly, better protect defendants against 
ex parte assertions of reasonable diligence that subvert due process. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF'S 
REDEMPTION OF THE PROPERTY FROM TAX SALES IN THE 
COURT'S DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court's consideration of Plaintiff s redemption of the 
Property from tax sales was proper under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. In support 
of this proposition, Plaintiff cites to Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950), and Parker, 217 P.2d 373. Plaintiff specifically refers to Mullane where the United 
States Supreme Court states: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections. 
339 U.S. at 314. Plaintiff then quotes Parker, where Justice Wolfe stated in his concurring 
opinion "The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable 
under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which may be conceived." 217 P.2d at 
379. 
While Plaintiff argues that this Court should read these two opinions as justification for a 
lower judge to consider any and all factors in determining due diligence, the actual language of 
these cases makes it clear that the Mullane and Parker Courts were not granting such broad 
discretion. The Mullane Court limited this consideration to the factors "reasonably 
calculated.. .to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action..." 339 U.S. at 314. 
Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in Parker noted that the relevant circumstances 
envisioned by this standard are those that relate to "that diligence which is appropriate to 
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accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so." 217 P.2d at 379. 
Justice Wolfe further explained, "If the end sought is the address of an out-of-state defendant 
(reasonable diligence) encompasses those steps most likely, under the circumstances, to 
accomplish that result." Id. 
Justice Wade, writing for the majority in Parker, quoted with approval from the 
California Supreme Court case of Rue v. Quinn, 137 Cal. 653, 66 P. 216 (1901): 
In making the order for the service by publication, the judge acts 
judicially upon the evidence which the Code requires to be 
presented to him for that purpose, and can act upon no other 
evidence than such as is prescribed by the Code. 
217 P.2d at 377. The "Code" which prescribes the evidence required to be presented to lower 
courts in Utah is Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule requires a 
supporting affidavit setting forth the efforts made to locate the defendant and the circumstances 
making it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. The affidavit submitted by Plaintiff 
does not aver the additional facts upon which Judge Shumate based his decision. 
Put simply, the means considered by the lower court in determining due diligence must 
be relevant to the end sought, i.e., giving notice to the Defendants. The factors relied on by the 
lower court in this case were clearly unrelated to this end. The fact that Plaintiff asserts to have 
redeemed the Property from two tax sales is irrelevant to the end of giving notice to Defendants 
as to the pendency of Plaintiff s claims. The means considered must also be contained in the 
Plaintiffs affidavit. Plaintiff did not assert in its affidavit that it redeemed the Property at any 
tax sales. 
The lower court's consideration of this extraneous factor is tantamount to a ruling that 
Defendants' failure to pay property taxes somehow diminishes Defendants' Constitutional rights 
to due process. No such declaration is found in Utah law. Also, the facts that Plaintiff did aver 
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in support of due diligence did not meet any common sense standard of a reasonable effort to 
locate the Defendants. Therefore, the trial court's order denying Defendants' Motion to Quash 
Service and Set Aside Default Judgment is improper and should be reversed. 
IV, THE ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT 
FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS THAT MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST A COTENANT. 
Plaintiff argues that the allegations contained in its Complaint were sufficient to state a 
cause of action for adverse possession against its cotenants, Defendants. In support of this 
contention, Plaintiff states that Mathews v. Baker, 155 P. 427 (Utah 1916), provides an excellent 
example of the conduct required to meet the requirements of adverse possession against a 
cotenant. In order to adversely possess property against a cotenant: 
(T)he one in possession must, by acts of the most open and 
notorious character, clearly show to the world, and to all having 
occasion to observe the condition and occupancy of the property, 
that his possession is intended to exclude, and does exclude, the 
rights of his cotenant.. .(H)e may do this by conduct, the 
implication of which cannot escape the notice of the world about 
him... 
Id. at 428-429 [Citing Elder v. McClaskey, 70F. 529, 542 (1895)]. Plaintiffs Complaint failed to 
allege facts that satisfy this standard. 
Plaintiff argues that Mathews is very analogous to the case at hand. Plaintiff claims that 
its allegations in its complaint were "very similar to the findings in Mathews." This claim is 
simply not accurate. The Mathews Court found that the plaintiff in that case had met the 
necessary standard by making vast improvements of the property that showed the property to be 
the plaintiffs own. The Plaintiff in Mathews built a five-room cottage, built an eight-room 
cottage, built a seven-room house, leveled the surface of the ground, built walks, planted 
shrubbery, and constructed outbuildings for the occupants of the cottages. Id. at 427. In short, 
the plaintiff in that case fully developed the property. The Mathews Court stated: 
Every act of the plaintiff in improving and using the property in 
question could be given but one construction or effect. From those 
acts and the use made of the property but one inference is 
permissible, and that is that the plaintiff claimed and used the 
property as her own and did so adversely to all the world. 
155 P. at 429. 
In contrast, Plaintiff claims to have improved the roads connected with the Property, 
fenced the perimeter of the Property, and improved the irrigation system. (R. at 3-6). These acts 
cannot "be given but one construction or effect" like the acts of the plaintiff in Mathews. A little 
work on the perimeter of a piece of property is not sufficient to give notice to the world "by acts 
of the most open and notorious character," that Plaintiffs "possession is intended to exclude, and 
does exclude, the rights of his cotenant." Building several multi-room cottages and 
accompanying outhouses, as well as significantly altering the land itself by leveling it, building 
walkways, and planting shrubbery are acts that would have the requisite effect of putting the 
world on notice of a cotenant's intent. 
In short, the difference between the actions taken by the plaintiff in Mathews and the 
actions taken by the Plaintiff is profound. The difference is between significant development of 
the property in Mathews and a bit of work on the perimeter of the Property by Plaintiff. 
Essentially, Mathews is helpful in illustrating how little Plaintiff did to put the world on notice of 
its "ouster" of Defendants. 
In its Brief of Appellee, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish several cases cited by 
Defendants in the Brief of Appellant. Plaintiff first attempts to distinguish the case at hand from 
McCready v. Frederickson, 126 P. 316 (Utah 1912). While the case at hand is somewhat 
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different factually from McCready, the two cases deal with a similar issue: whether the purchase 
or redemption of property by a cotenant at a tax sale "can be construed as constituting an ouster 
of appellant, his cotenant." Id. at 320. The McCready Court's answer to this question was a firm 
"no." Id. at 320. The McCready Court specifically held that in circumstances where a cotenant 
redeems the property at a tax sale, "the one who pays does so, not only for the benefit of himself, 
but also for the use and benefit of all of his cotenants." Id. In addition, that Court stated, "The 
mere act of paying the taxes under such circumstances cannot be regarded as an act which in any 
way disturbs any right of the cotenant; but under the law, the presumption always is that the act 
was for the use and benefit of all interested in the premises." Id. This Court reaffirmed this legal 
principle in subsequent cases. See Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.2d 139,141-142 (Utah 1983); Massey 
v. Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1983); Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 762 
(Utah 1990); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff proposes that the language of the Court's opinion in McCready "suggests the 
decision is limited to the facts of the case." (See Brief of Appellee, p. 21). However, nowhere in 
this opinion does the Court specifically state or even imply that their decision is so limited. In 
fact, this Court has unequivocally reaffirmed the legal principles set forth in McCready in several 
subsequent cases. See Jolley, 671 P.2d at 141-142; Massey, 664 P.2d at 1178; Sweeney Land 
Co., 786 P.2d at 762 (Utah 1990); Olwell, 658 P.2d at 589. Even the Court's opinion in 
Mathews, upon which Plaintiff relies so heavily, specifically cites with approval to the legal 
principles set forth in McCready. 155 P. at 428. 
Plaintiff next attempts to distinguish Olwell, 658 P.2d 585, from the case at hand by 
claiming factual distinctions. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Olwell is distinguishable because 
the plaintiff in that case did not make any improvements upon the property. However, 
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Defendants did not cite Olwell for that proposition. Instead, Olwell stands for the proposition 
that a claimant's payment of taxes, preservation of title, possession, use and reputation as sole 
owner are insufficient to inform cotenants of the adverse claim. Id. at 589. 
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Sperry v. Tolley, 199 P.2d 542 (Utah 1948), from 
the present case. Plaintiff argues that due to factual differences, Sperry does not control the case 
at hand. While the facts of the two cases are not identical, the factual differences upon which 
Plaintiff relies are inconsequential to the legal issues presented in Sperry and in the case at hand. 
Plaintiff argues that Sperry is distinguishable because, here, unlike in Sperry, Plaintiff acted 
alone in paying taxes on the Property and in improving the Property. The Sperry Court, 
however, ruled, "any act done by a cotenant for the protection of the common property will be 
presumed to be for the benefit of all tenants. 199 P.2d at 546 (Quoting McCready, 126 P. 316). 
The Sperry Court clearly stated that the purchase by one cotenant of a tax title is such an act that 
is presumed to be for the benefit of all. 199 P.2d at 546. Therefore, this act, whether done by 
one cotenant or two, is insufficient to put the other cotenants on notice of adverse claims. Id. 
Likewise, the Sperry Court ruled that "the repairs and improvements made in the 
dwellings, buildings and fences are acts normally consistent with a tenancy in common and not 
adverse to it." Id. Here, Plaintiff made no improvement on the Property itself besides putting a 
fence on the perimeter and improving the existing irrigation system. Whether these acts are done 







For the foregoing reasons, trial court's order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion 
to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment should be reversed. 
Alt DATED this /M day of August 2003 
issell J. Gallian 
of and for 
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